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Abstract
Multi-issue allocation situations study problems where we have to divide an estate among
a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by
each agent on each issue. We present a two-stage rule. First we divide the estate among
the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second, the amount assigned to each
issue is divided among the agents proportionally to their demands on this issue. We apply
such rule to two real problems: the distribution of natural resources between countries and
the distribution of budget for education and research between universities.
Keywords: multi-issue allocation situations, proportional rule, constrained equal awards
rule.
1 Introduction
Bankruptcy situations study problems where an estate must be divided among several claimants.
The problem arises when the estate is not enough to cover all claims. A typical example is when a
firm goes bankrupt. The objective is to identify well-behaved rules for dividing the estate among
the agents. This literature originates in O’Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985). Two
of the most popular rules are the proportional rule and the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA)
rule. See Thomson (2003, 2015) for a survey.
In bankruptcy situations each agent’s claim is a number. In many real situations we have
to divide an estate among a group of agents, as in bankruptcy for instance, but the claim of
each agent is a vector. In many Spanish Universities, once they have decided on the total annual
operating budget for each department, the procedure is as follows. The university decides the
money that will be assigned to the departments. The departments then submit a quantified
request for each issue, typically research and teaching. Finally, the university decides the amount
each department receives. More examples are: The European Community divides the budget
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among several issues (agriculture, roads, research, ...) and each state (Spain, France, ...) has
claims over the different issues. The government of Spain divides the budget among several issues
(health, education, ...) and each “Comunidad Auto´noma” (Galicia, Madrid, Catalonia, ...) has
claims over the different issues.
A Multi-Issue Allocation (MIA) is an extension of the basic bankruptcy model described
above. In a MIA situation an estate must be divided among agents that make claims for several
issues and the estate does not cover all claims. These situations were introduced in Calleja et
al (2005). An approach used in the literature to solve these situations consists in considering a
two-stage procedure. First, the estate is divided among issues. Second, the amount assigned to
each issue is divided among agents. With this approach a rule is a matrix f where fki denotes the
amount received by agent i on issue k. Several papers have provided axiomatic characterizations
of rules. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2010) and Bergantin˜os et al (2011) study the two stage CEA
rule. In the first stage, the estate is divided among the issues following the CEA bankruptcy
rule. Second, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents following also the
CEA bankruptcy rule. Moreno-Ternero (2009) and Bergantin˜os et al (2010) study the two stage
proportional rule.
We then study the two-stage rule that divides the estate among the issues following the CEA
bankruptcy rule and inside each issue following the proportional bankruptcy rule. We give two
axiomatic characterizations of this rule. Both are obtained by combining characterizations of the
CEA bankruptcy rule and the proportional bankruptcy rule. The first one combines the results
of Yeh (2006) for the CEA bankruptcy rule and Chun (1988) for the proportional bankruptcy
rule. The second one combines the results of Herrero and Villar (2002) for the CEA bankruptcy
rule and Chun (1988) for the proportional bankruptcy rule. It is very important to characterize
rules axiomatically because we need fair allocation procedures. For example, these methods can
be used to solve monetary problems where an asset must be divided among several creditors or
resource allocation problems where a natural resource such water, oil or natural gas, must be
divided between several territories claiming for the exploitation of these resources.
In addition to the two axiomatic characterizations of this sharing rule, in the last section of
the paper we apply the rule to two real examples: the distribution of natural resources between
countries and the distribution of budget for education and research between universities. We also
analyze the consequences on the properties used in the axiomatic characterizations in the real
problems we consider.
Natural resource problems can be solved by using this type of models. The Caspian Sea is
a region that has a large reserve of oil and natural gas. Even the reserves have not yet been
well quantified, the first estimations suggest that we would be ahead of the world’s largest oil
and natural gas reserves. Currently, the Caspian Sea shares borders with Azerbaijan, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. International organizations have proposed different legal
status for the sharing of the Caspian Sea among the five countries, but there is no definitive
agreement yet. For this reason, these countries are in continuous dispute over the ownership of the
resources located in certain areas of the region. In the negotiations we have two countries claiming
the ownership of the same oil or natural gas wells. Thus, some authors as Sheikhmohammady
and Madani (2008) propose to resolve the dispute through a bankruptcy situation. In particular,
they compare the results obtained using different bankruptcy rules as the proportional and the
constrained equal awards. In this paper, we take the data from Sheikhmohammady and Madani
(2008) and apply the MIA rule introduced in this paper to such data.
In European countries, universities are mostly funded with public money. They provide
2
teaching and research. The regional or central government must divide the budget between
universities to cover the spent on these two issues. Although universities are non-market based
structures, politics aims to rectors the use of business concepts in the budget manage. Therefore,
we observe that the budget is divided among universities using competitive rules. As well,
universities give the same importance to teaching as to research. Several papers have studied
this problem from different perspectives. See, for instance, Del Rey (2001), Ball and Butler
(2004), and Gautier and Wauthy (2007). Faden and Gal (2001) study the redistribution of funds
for teaching and research among universities in the North Rhine-Westphalia region in Germany.
We study the same problem but our proposal is to solve it using the MIA rule we have introduced.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce MIA situations. In Section 3
we introduce and study the two stage MIA rule. In Section 4 we apply such rule to the two real
cases.
2 Multi-issue allocation situations
In this section we introduce bankruptcy situations, multi-issue allocation situations, and some
rules.
We now introduce several concepts in bankruptcy situations. See, for instance, Thomson
(2003, 2015) for a survey on this topic.
A bankruptcy situation is a triple (N,E, c). N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. The estate
E ≥ 0 represents the amount to be divided among the agents. Finally c = (ci)i∈N ∈ RN+ and ci
denotes the claim of player i. It is assumed that 0 ≤ E ≤ ∑
i∈N
ci. When no confusion arises we
use (E, c) instead of (N,E, c).
A bankruptcy rule is a map ψ that associates with each bankruptcy situation (E, c) a vector
ψ(E, c) ∈ RN satisfying that ∑
i∈N
ψi(E, c) = E and 0 ≤ ψi(E, c) ≤ ci for each i ∈ N .
The proportional rule (P ) is defined for each i ∈ N as Pi(E, c) = λci where λ satisfies∑
i∈N
λci = E.
The constrained equal awards rule (CEA) is defined for each i ∈ N as CEAi(E, c) =
min{λ, ci} where λ satisfies
∑
i∈N
min{λ, ci} = E.
We now introduce several properties of bankruptcy rules that are relevant for this paper.
Conditional full compensation (FC). For each bankruptcy situation (E, c) and each i ∈ N, if∑
j∈N
min {cj , ci} ≤ E, then ψi(E, c) = ci.
Claims monotonicity (CM). For each bankruptcy situation (E, c) and each i, j ∈ N, if cj ≥ ci,
then ψj(E, c) ≥ ψi(E, c).
No advantageous transfer (NAT ). For each (E, c), (E, c′), and M ⊂ N such that ci = c′i
when i ∈ N \M and ∑
i∈M
c′i =
∑
i∈M
ci, then
∑
i∈M
ψi(E, c) =
∑
i∈M
ψi(E, c
′). This property can be
defined in a strong way by claiming, ψi(E, c) = ψi(E, c
′) for all i ∈ N \M. The idea is that no
group of agents should receive more by transferring claims among themselves.
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Composition down (CD). For each (E, c) and each E′ ∈ R such that E′ ≥ E, f(E, c) =
f(E, f(E′, c)).
Calleja et al (2005) introduce multi-issue allocation situations generalizing bankruptcy situ-
ations.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation is a 4-tuple (R,N,E,C), where R = {1, . . . , r} is
the set of issues. N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided.
C = (cki)k∈R,i∈N ∈ RR×N+ and cki represents the amount claimed by agent i ∈ N on issue k ∈ R.
We assume 0 ≤ E ≤ ∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
cki.
Note that a bankruptcy situation is a MIA situation with |R| = 1.
For defining a rule we have two possibilities. First, to assign to each agent a part of the estate,
see Calleja et al (2005), Gonza´lez-Alco´n et al (2007), and Ju et al (2007). Second, to specify
the amount each agent receives in each issue, see Moreno-Ternero (2009), Lorenzo-Freire et al
(2010), and Bergantin˜os et al (2010, 2011). In this paper we follow the second approach. Thus,
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) rule f is a map that associates with each MIA situation
(R,N,E,C) a matrix f(R,N,E,C) ∈ RR×N satisfying:
• 0 ≤ fki(R,N,E,C) ≤ cki for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N.
• ∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) = E.
Lorenzo-Freire et al (2010) define a two-stage procedure to define MIA rules from bankruptcy
rules. They first apply a bankruptcy rule for dividing the estate among the issues. Later, the
amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents claiming on this issue. We follow the
same idea considering that the bankruptcy rule used at each step can be different.
Let ψ and φ be two bankruptcy rules and let (R,N,E,C) be a MIA situation. The two-stage
rule fψ,φ(R,N,E,C) is the MIA rule obtained from the following two-stage procedure:
1. First stage. Consider the so-called bankruptcy situation among the issues (R,E, cR), where
cR = (cR1 , . . . , c
R
r ) ∈ RR denotes the vector of total claims in the issues, i.e. for each k ∈ R,
cRk =
∑
i∈N
cki . The amount E is divided among the issues using the bankruptcy rule ψ.
2. Second stage. For each k ∈ R, consider the bankruptcy situation given by (N,ψk(R,E, cR), (cki)i∈N )
and apply the bankruptcy rule φ.
Thus, for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N we define
fψ,φki (R,N,E,C) = φi(N,ψk(R,E, c
R), (cki)i∈N ).
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3 The mixed rule
In many Spanish universities, when deciding the annual operating budget that each department
will receive, the procedure is as follows. The university decides the money that will be assigned to
the departments. The departments submit a quantified amount for each issue, typically research
and teaching. Finally, the university decides the amount each department will receive for each
issue.
The university authorities argue that research and teaching are two important issues of the
university and no one is more important than the other. In our model this idea can be applied
by claiming that the amount devoted to research and teaching should be as equal as possible.
Nevertheless, within each issue (research or teaching) the authorities argue that agents are, in
general, different. Then, the amount they receive should recognize these differences. For instance,
in the university of Vigo, the amount each department receives for research is proportional to the
number of points the department obtains. The points are computed taking into account several
issues as publications, books, and so on. In our model this idea could be applied by claiming
that the amount each agent receives in each issue is proportional to his claim on the issue.
We then study the two stage rule which divides among the issues following the CEA bankruptcy
rule and inside each issue following the proportional bankruptcy rule. We give two axiomatic
characterizations which are obtained by combining characterizations of the CEA bankruptcy rule
and the proportional bankruptcy rule.
The two-stage constrained equal awards (CEA) - proportional (PRO) rule is the two-stage
MIA rule fψ,φ where ψ = CEA and φ = P . Then, fCEA,P is defined as follows: for each
(R,N,E,C), each k ∈ R, and each i ∈ N ,
fCEA,Pki (R,N,E,C) = Pi
(
N,CEAk(R,E, c
R), (cki)i∈N
)
.
It is obvious that fCEA,P can be rewritten as
cki
cRk
min{λ, cRk } where λ satisfies
∑
k∈R
min{λ, cRk } =
E.
Theorem 4 in Thomson (2003) presents several characterizations of the CEA bankruptcy rule
obtained, among others, by Herrero and Villar (2002) and Yeh (2006). In Theorem 8, Thomson
(2003) presents several characterizations of the proportional bankruptcy rule obtained, among
others, by Chun (1988) and Young (1988).
Our axiomatic characterizations are obtained by combining these characterizations. This is
not a trivial issue. For instance, Young (1988) characterizes the proportional bankruptcy rule with
self duality and composition down. Self duality is defined in MIA situations as in bankruptcy
situations (Bergantin˜os et al 2011). Since fCEA,P does not satisfy self duality, we cannot use
this result for obtaining a characterization of fCEA,P .
We give two axiomatic characterizations of fCEA,P . The first one combines the results of Yeh
(2006) and Chun (1988). The second one combines the results of Herrero and Villar (2002) and
Chun (1988).
We now extend bankruptcy properties to MIA properties. In some cases the definition is the
same, as in the case of composition down. In other cases the properties are adapted by claiming
them among the issues or within each issue.
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No advantageous transfer inside the issues (NATI). Let (R,N,E,C), (R,N,E,C ′), k ∈ R,
and M ⊂ N be such that ∑
i∈M
c′ki =
∑
i∈M
cki and c
′
li = cli when l ∈ R \ {k} or i ∈ N \M. Then
for each i ∈ N \M ,
fki(R,N,E,C) = fki(R,N,E,C
′).
NATI says that if a group of agents redistribute their claims inside an issue, the amount
assigned to the other agents in this issue does not change.
Conditional full compensation among the issues (FCA). For each (R,N,E,C) and each k ∈ R
such that
∑
l∈R
min
{∑
i∈N
cli,
∑
i∈N
cki
}
≤ E,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
cki.
The idea behind this property is that if the total claim in an issue is small when comparing
with the total claim in the other issues, then the total amount allocated to issue k must coincide
with its total claim. Note that FCA can be rewritten as fki(R,N,E,C) = cki for all i ∈ N
instead of
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
cki.
Claims monotonicity among the issues (CMA). Let (R,N,E,C), (R,N,E,C ′), and k ∈ R be
such that
∑
i∈N
cki ≤
∑
i∈N
c′ki and cli = c
′
li for each l ∈ R \ {k}. Then for each i ∈ N ,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) ≤
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C
′).
CMA says that if the total claim of an issue increases, then the total allocation assigned to
this issue cannot decrease.
Composition down is defined as in bankruptcy situations.
Composition down (CD). For each (R,N,E,C) and each E′ ∈ R such that E′ ≥ E,
f(R,N,E,C) = f(R,N,E, f(R,N,E′, C)).
Theorem 1 (a) If |N | ≥ 3, fCEA,P is the unique rule satisfying FCA, CMA, and NATI.
(b) fCEA,P is the unique rule satisfying CD, FCA, and NATI.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Using similar arguments to those used in Bergantin˜os et al (2010, 2011) we can prove that
fCEA,P satisfies FCA, CMA, CD, and NATI.
(a) We now prove that fCEA,P is the only one. Let f be a rule satisfying FCA, CMA, and
NATI. We first prove that for each k ∈ R,∑
i∈N
fki (R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEA,Pki (R,N,E,C) . (1)
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Let q = (qki)k∈R,i∈N be such that for each k ∈ R, (qki)i∈N belongs to the simplex in RN . For
each bankruptcy situation (R,E, (xk)k∈R), we define the bankruptcy rule fq such that for each
k ∈ R,
fqk (R,E, (xk)k∈R) =
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E, (qkixk)k∈R,i∈N ).
Since f is a MIA rule, fq is a bankruptcy rule. We now prove that fq satisfies FC and CM
in bankruptcy situations.
• FC. Let k ∈ R be such that ∑
l∈R
min {xl, xk} ≤ E. Thus,
∑
l∈R
min
{∑
i∈N
qlixl,
∑
i∈N
qkixk
}
≤ E.
Since f satisfies FCA, fki(R,N,E, (qlixl)l∈R,i∈N ) = qkixk for all i ∈ N . Hence, fqk (R,E, (xk)k∈R) =∑
i∈N
qkixk = xk.
• CM. Let k, k′ ∈ R be such that xk ≥ xk′ . Thus,
∑
i∈N
qkixk ≥
∑
i∈N
qk′ixk′ . Since f satisfies
CMA,
fqk (R,E, (xl)l∈R) =
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E, (qlixl)l∈R,i∈N )
≥
∑
i∈N
fk′i(R,N,E, (qlixl)l∈R,i∈N )
= fqk′(R,E, (xl)l∈R).
Yeh (2006) proves that CEA is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying FC and CM. Thus,
fq = CEA.
Consider (xk)k∈R and q such that xk =
∑
i∈N
cki and qki =
cki
xk
for each (k, i) ∈ R ×N . Now,
it is trivial to deduce that (1) holds.
We now prove that for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N ,
fki(R,N,E, (clj)l∈R,j∈N ) = f
CEA,P
ki (R,N,E, (clj)l∈R,j∈N ).
Let dk = (dlj)l∈R\{k},j∈N ∈ RR\{k}×N+ . For each bankruptcy situation (N,E, (yi)i∈N ) we
define the bankruptcy rule fd
k
such that for each i ∈ N
fd
k
i (N,E, (yj)j∈N ) = fki(R,N,E
d, (dlj)l∈R,j∈N )
where dkj = yj and E
d satisfies min
{
λd,
∑
i∈N
dki
}
= E and
∑
l∈R
min
{
λd,
∑
i∈N
dli
}
= Ed. We
prove that fd
k
= P .
We first prove that fd
k
is well defined, namely, that it is a bankruptcy rule.
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• Since f is a MIA rule, for each i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ fki(R,N,Ed, (dlj)l∈R,j∈N ) ≤ dki = yi.
• By (1), ∑
i∈N
fd
k
i (N,E, (yj)j∈N ) =
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
d, (dlj)l∈R,j∈N )
=
∑
i∈N
fCEA,Pki (R,N,E
d, (dlj)l∈R,j∈N )
= min
{
λ,
∑
i∈N
dki
}
where
∑
l∈R
min
{
λ,
∑
i∈N
dli
}
= Ed. Thus, λ = λd and hence,
∑
i∈N
fd
k
i (N,E, (yj)j∈N ) = min
{
λd,
∑
i∈N
dki
}
= E.
We now prove that fd
k
satisfies NAT in bankruptcy situations. Let (N,E, y), (N,E, y′), and
M ⊂ N such that yi = y′i when i ∈ N \M and
∑
i∈M
y′i =
∑
i∈M
yi. Thus, d
′
li = dli when l ∈ R \ {k}
or i ∈ N \M and ∑
i∈M
d′ki =
∑
i∈M
y′i =
∑
i∈M
yi =
∑
i∈M
dki.
For each i ∈ N \M ,
fd
k
i (N,E, y
′) = fki(R,N,Ed
′
, (d′lj)l∈R,j∈N ).
Since f satisfies NATI,
fki(R,N,E
d′ , (d′lj)l∈R,j∈N ) = fki(R,N,E
d′ , (dlj)l∈R,j∈N ).
By (1), it is easy to deduce that Ed = Ed
′
. Then,
fki(R,N,E
d′ , (dlj)l∈R,j∈N ) = fd
k
i (N,E, y).
Hence fd
k
satisfies NAT . Since P is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying NAT (Chun,
1988), fd
k
= P .
We define dk such that for each l ∈ R \ {k} and each j ∈ N , dlj = clj . Besides, we take
yj = dkj = ckj for all j ∈ N . Because of the definition of CEA it is easy to conclude that
CEAk(R,E, c
R)d = E. Now
fki(R,N,E, c) = f
dk
i (N,CEAk(R,E, c
R), (ckj)j∈N )
= Pi(N,CEAk(R,E, c
R), (ckj)j∈N )
= fCEA,Pki (R,N,E, (clj)l∈R,j∈N ).
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(b) The proof of the uniqueness is similar to case (a) and we omit it. 
We prove that the properties used in Theorem 1 are independent. Let α be the bankruptcy
rule in which we fulfill the claims by increasing order. Namely, given (E, c) such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤
.... ≤ cn we can find j ∈ N satisfying
∑
i≤j
ci ≤ E <
∑
i≤j+1
ci. Thus, αi(E, c) = ci when i ≤ j,
αj+1(E, c) = E −
∑
i≤j
ci and αi(E, c) = 0 when i > j + 1.
Let δ be the bankruptcy rule defined by Herrero and Villar (2002).
Next tables show that the properties used in Theorem 1 are independent. The proofs are left
to the reader.
Independence of the properties of Theorem 1 (a):
Properties / Rules fP,P fα,P fCEA,CEA
FCA No Yes Yes
CMA Yes No Yes
NATI Yes Yes No
Independence of the properties of Theorem 1 (b):
Properties / Rules fP,P fδ,P fCEA,CEA
FCA No Yes Yes
CD Yes No Yes
NATI Yes Yes No
4 Applications to real problems
In this section we apply the rule introduced in the previous section to two real problems. The
sharing of natural resources among countries and the sharing of funds among universities.
4.1 Sharing oil and natural gas resources of the Caspian Sea among
countries
The Caspian Sea is a region that has a large reserve of oil and natural gas. The proven and
probable reserves have not yet been well quantified. The US Energy Information Administration
(EIA) estimates “that there were 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of
natural gas in proved and probable reserves within the basins that make up the Caspian Sea and
surrounding area in 2012” (EIA report on the Caspian Sea, 2013). If these measurements were
true, we would be ahead of the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves. That is why the
exploitation of these resources is one of the main tasks of the countries located in this region.
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Currently, the Caspian Sea shares borders with Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and
Turkmenistan. International organizations have proposed different legal status for the sharing of
the Caspian Sea among the five countries, but there is still no a definitive agreement. For this
reason, these countries are in continuous dispute over the ownership of the resources located in
certain areas of the region. Newer countries do not have the technology to exploit oil and natural
gas, and therefore they have to resort to agreements with oil companies. Obviously, the greater
the reserves managed, the easier it will be to sign agreements with these oil companies for the
joint exploitation of resources. Zimnitskaya and Geldern (2011) deals in detail with the problem
of the sharing of the Caspian Sea among the five countries in dispute.
The legal proposals for the division of the Caspian Sea have been numerous. Before the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union (USSR), the Caspian Sea was divided between the USSR and Iran from
a series of treaties. However, after the demise of the USSR, three new Border States appear in
the Caspian Sea that also seek to exploit these resources. These countries are Russia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, these new countries do not agree to continue with the
old treaties signed between the USSR and Iran.
The UN proposes a sharing based on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 15 of UNCLOS
requires that the sea of the countries with opposite or adjacent coasts may not be extended
“beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the
baselines form which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the [two] States is measured”.
Other possible distribution rules would be the equal division of the Caspian Sea or the equal
distribution of oil and natural gas reserves (Condominium).
In the negotiations countries propose different rules for solving the sharing problem. This
position has resulted in two countries claiming the ownership of the same oil or natural gas wells.
Thus, some authors as Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008) propose to resolve the dispute in
the Caspian Sea through a bankruptcy situation. In particular, they compare the results using
some bankruptcy rules as the proportional and the constrained equal awards. In this paper, we
take the data from Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008) and apply the MIA rule analyzed in
this paper to such data.
The MIA situation (R,N,E,C) associated to the Caspian Sea is the following:
1. R has two issues: oil and natural gas.
2. N has 5 agents, the five countries we have mentioned.
3. The estate E is the value of the total reserves of oil and natural gas. According to Sheikhmo-
hammady and Madani (2008) it is 13,512 billion of dollars. We should mention that these
values could change as new oil and natural gas prospecting are carried out in the region.
4. The vector of claims C is also obtained from Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008). Table
1 below shows the values in billions of dollars of oil and gas claims made by the five countries.
The total value of the all the claims is 17,791 billion dollars.
Table 1. Values of oil and natural gas claimed by countries
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Countries Oil (billion $) Natural gas (billion $)
Azerbaijan 2,060 521
Iran 2,016 686
Kazakhstan 5,050 918
Russia 2,016 686
Turkmenistan 2,190 1,648
Total claims 13,332 4,459
Now we apply the MIA rule fCEA,P to the previous MIA situation. Remember that we
first divide the estate between the two issues following the CEA rule, and secondly, we divide
the money allocated to each issue among the five countries following the P rule. Theorem 1
shows that fCEA,P is the only rule that satisfies the CD, FCA, and NATI properties. The
implications of these properties in the Caspian Sea problem are very interesting. CD implies
that if new prospecting actions change the amounts of oil or natural gas (very common in the
Caspian Sea), and the current value is smaller than the expected value, it is indifferent to solve
the new problem or to solve a problem with the reduced estate and where the claims are the
allocations in the overestimated estate. Thus, renegotiations will be easier. FCA tells us that if
the claim of one of the issues (oil of natural gas) is less than the equal distribution of the state
between both issues, that issue should be fully compensated. NATI implies that if two countries
reach a new agreement on ownership of an oil well, this change does not affect the allocation of
other countries.
Table 2 below shows the results obtained after applying fCEA,P .
Table 2. Allocation based on fCEA,P .
Countries
Oil
(billion $)
Natural gas
(billion $)
Total
allocation
Azerbaijan 1,399 521 1,920
Iran 1,369 686 2,055
Kazakhstan 3,429 918 4,347
Russia 1,369 686 2,055
Turkmenistan 1,487 1,648 3,135
Sum 9,053 4,459 13,512
Notice that in this case countries receive the claimed amount of natural gas and the rest of
the total value of the reserves (9,053 billion of dollars) is distributed among the five countries
proportionally to their claims of oil.
Table 3 below compares the results obtained by fCEA,P with the ones discussed in Sheikhmo-
hammady and Madani (2008). Namely, the P rule, the CEA rule and the AP rule.
Table 3. Comparing the different allocations
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Countries P rule CEA rule AP rule fCEA,P
Azerbaijan 1,960 2,580 1,895 1,920
Iran 2,052 2,702 1,984 2,055
Kazakhstan 4,533 2,764 4,831 4,347
Russia 2,052 2,702 1,984 2,055
Turkmenistan 2,915 2,764 2,818 3,135
Sum 13,512 13,512 13,512 13,512
Source: Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008).
Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008) conclude that the CEA rule is the best one when we
consider social choice but the P rule is better when we try to maximize the minimum satisfaction.
The fCEA,P is closer to the P rule than to the CEA rule.
More natural resource problems can be solved by using this type of models. An example is
the resolution of conflict in water resources. Nowadays there is not an accepted international
agreement about a sharing rule of water resources. There exists a normative principle of “equi-
table and reasonable utilization”. Since there is not a consensus about how to interpret equitable
and reasonable utilization, conflicts frequently appear when, for example, a river flows between
different borders or several countries share borders in a lake or a sea. For example, Mianabadi et
al (2014) and Oftaldeh et al (2016) propose a bankruptcy approach to solve some water conflicts.
4.2 Sharing funds for teaching and research among universities: the
case of North Rhine-Westphalia
Funding of European universities is done mostly through public money. Universities and regional
governments meet together to discuss a funding plan for a specific period (usually for 5 or 10
years). Generally, each university presents to the government some objectives, to be reached in
that period, and the estimated cost to achieve them. The government also presents the total
budget for universities.
Traditionally, university funding depended primarily on the number of students enrolled.
Currently, this funding seeks to enhance the two main functions of a university: teaching and
research. Governments are increasingly aware that the decision to enroll in a particular university
depends on the quality of education as well as the prestige of the university in the field of research.
Thus, in these meetings, universities and government decide how much money is destined
for teaching and research. Finally, this money is distributed among the different universities
attending to both the objectives set by them and by the government. In this distribution, the
government seeks to encourage competition between universities by rewarding with greater budget
those institutions with greater achievements in the two issues.
The problem is to agree on how to evaluate the achievements in teaching and research (its
weight in funding). Universities are very heterogeneous (some universities are older than others,
for example), and usually do not agree on the sharing rule to be applied.
In this context, a MIA procedure can be a good proposal for the allocation of the budget.
Each university makes a claim for money to the government for teaching and a claim for research,
based on valuations of achievements obtained in the past. Since the valuations each university
assigns to teaching and research do not coincide among different universities, the final sum of the
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claims usually exceeds the total amount the public administration is willing to invest in financing
the universities. The MIA procedure, analyzed in this work, proposes a fair solution to this
problem since it satisfies desirable axiomatic properties in this type of sharing rules.
As an example, we have applied our rule to a real case that has already been studied in the
literature. The redistribution of funds for teaching and research among universities in the North
Rhine-Westphalia region in Germany (Fanden and Gal, 2001).
The North Rhine-Westphalia government brings together the 15 universities in the region to
distribute public funds for universities. The government proposes to allocate funds according to
three teaching criteria and two research criteria. The teaching criteria are the percentages of
academic staff, number of students and number of graduates of each university over the total
of the region. The research criteria correspond to the percentages of external funds obtained
for research and the number of theses approved on the regional total. From these variables,
universities and government have to agree on the weight that each one of these variables will
have in the distribution of the budget.
Negotiations between universities and government were formally described as a Multiple Cri-
teria Decision Making (MCDM) problem. The solution to this problem consisted of the five
weights that are assigned to each of the teaching and research variables. This weighting vector
transforms the percentages of each university with respect to the five different variables into a
total share of the university budget. Universities and authority valued seven situations resulting
from the resolution of seven different MCDMs (see Table 4). Each of them gave different budgets
to the 15 universities involved. Universities and government agreed on the sharing rule shown in
column 7 of Table 4.
Table 4. Weighting vectors for the seven proposed sharing rules.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Teaching
Acad. personnel 0.2 0 0 0.0503 0.1546 0 0.2
Students 0.2 0 0.2614 0.2647 0.1348 0.2598 0.2
Graduates 0.2 0.1942 0.5120 0.4648 0.5051 0.5806 0.35
Research
Outside funds 0.2 0.4305 0.1746 0.1720 0.2045 0.1596 0.2
Ph. Ds 0.2 0.3752 0.0520 0.0482 0 0 0.05
Source: Fandel and Gal (2001).
However, what happens when no agreement is reached? At this point, this problem could be
considered as a MIA situation (R,N,E,C) as follows.
1. R has two issues: teaching and research.
2. N has 15 agents, the 15 universities.
3. The estate E is the budget devoted by government to the universities. According with
Fandel and Gal (2001) 148.58 millions of DM of the year 1996, when the authors realized
the study of redistribution of the budget among the universities.
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4. We compute the vector of claims C as follows. The claim of each university in teaching and
research is defined as the highest allocation in teaching and research that each university
will receive among the seven sharing rules mentioned above. In Table 5 below we compute
such claims.
Table 5. Claims based on the best rule for each university.
Universities Best rule Teaching Research Total
Aachen 2 4.42 21.19 25.61
Bielefeld 2 1.04 9.21 10.26
Bochum 2 2.55 13.25 15.80
Bonn 2 3.43 17.18 20.61
Dortmund 4 9.31 1.84 11.15
Dusseldorf 2 0.83 6.32 7.15
Cologne 6 13.78 2.07 15.84
Munster 6 14.77 2.17 16.94
DSH Cologne 6 2.44 0.28 2.71
Duisburg 5 4.8 0.66 5.46
Essen 6 6.85 0.77 7.61
Paderborn 6 7.59 0.87 8.46
Siegen 5 4.65 1.23 5.88
Wuppertal 7 5.58 1.47 7.04
FU Hagen 7 2.10 1.21 3.31
Total claims 84.13 79.71 163.84
Source: Calculations obtained from data in Fandel and Gal (2001).
Notice that the total claim of the universities is 163.48, greater than the estate (148.58).
If we solve this problem as a MIA situation we proceed as follows. At the first stage, the total
budget is distributed between teaching and research following the CEA rule. Thus, half of the
total budget is devoted to teaching and half to research. Later, the part of the budget devoted
to teaching (respectively research) is divided among the universities following the proportional
rule. As we demonstrated above, this rule is the unique that would meet the properties of CD,
FCA, and NATI. The same good implications of such properties, as explained in the previous
example, can be found here.
Table 6 below shows the allocation obtained with fCEA,P and the allocation used in practice.
Table 6. Allocation based on fCEA,P .
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Universities
fCEA,P
Teaching
Practice
Teaching
fCEA,P
Research
Practice
Research
fCEA,P
Total
Practice
Total
Aachen 3.91 15.03 19.75 6.09 23.66 21.12
Bielefeld 0.92 5.09 8.59 3.41 9.51 8.51
Bochum 2.25 10.36 12.35 4.13 14.60 14.49
Bonn 3.03 11.85 16.01 5.04 19.04 16.89
Dortmund 8.22 9.09 1.71 2.03 9.93 11.12
Dusseldorf 0.73 4.45 5.89 1.84 6.62 6.29
Cologne 12.17 11.51 1.93 3.39 14.09 14.90
Munster 13.04 12.36 2.02 3.50 15.06 15.86
DSH Cologne 2.15 1.89 0.26 0.38 2.41 2.27
Duisburg 4.24 4.58 0.61 0.85 4.85 5.44
Essen 6.04 6.32 0.71 1.19 6.76 7.52
Paderborn 6.70 6.72 0.81 1.27 7.51 7.99
Siegen 4.11 4.49 1.14 1.35 5.25 5.84
Wuppertal 4.93 5.58 1.37 1.47 6.29 7.04
FU Hagen 1.86 2.10 1.13 1.21 2.99 3.31
Total 74.29 111.44 74.29 37.14 148.58 148.58
Source: Fandel and Gal (2001) and calculations from such data.
Looking at Table 5 we realize that for five universities the best sharing rule is 2, for five
universities the best sharing rule is 6, for two universities is 5, for two universities is 7, and for
one university is 4. Looking at Table 4 we realize that in sharing rule 2 research has a greater
weight than teaching (80% research versus 20% teaching) while for sharing rules 4, 5, 6 and 7
teaching has a greater weight than research. Notice that in the selected sharing rule (7) the weight
of teaching is 75% and the weight of research is 25%. Since five universities are better in sharing
rule 2 (where research is more important than teaching), 10 universities are better under sharing
rules where teaching is more important than research, and the sharing rule selected is 7, we can
guess that the sharing rule selected represents the interest of the majority of the universities, but
not all of them. Looking at Table 6 we realize that the five universities for which the best sharing
rule is 2, receive more with the MIA rule. The other ten universities but DSH Cologne, receive
less with the MIA rule.
During the negotiations between the universities and the government, universities know that
the final allocation they will receive depends on the sharing rule used. Thus, each university
has strong incentives to support the sharing rules in which receives a higher budget, instead of
supporting the sharing rules which is more fair for the whole university system.
In practice is quite difficult to avoid this problem. If we want to mitigate it, then we have
several possibilities. One, is to select the sharing rule supported by the majority of the univer-
sities. This seems to be behind the allocation used in this case. The problem is the asymmetric
treatment of the universities. For some of them we select the sharing rule that gives them a large
allocation, but for others we select a sharing rule that gives them a small allocation.
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With the MIA rule we avoid this asymmetry because for each university we select as claims
the allocation that gives such university the largest amount (among the seven sharing rules).
Since this allocation is above the budget, we apply the MIA rule for obtaining an allocation
dividing the real budget.
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